John P. Sampson and Milton R. Goff v. Paul H. Richins, Richtron Inc., Richtron Financial Corporation, Richtron General, and Frontier Investments : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
John P. Sampson and Milton R. Goff v. Paul H.
Richins, Richtron Inc., Richtron Financial
Corporation, Richtron General, and Frontier
Investments : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Anderson; Biele, Haslam & Hatch; Attorneys for Respondents.
Craig S. Cook; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Sampson and Goff v. Richins, No. 890146.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2524
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO.'. 
UTAH SUVKtivic wuuiv. 
BRIEE 
mux* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Petitioner, Appellant 
and Cross Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually 
and as Trustee of MILTON R. 
GOFF TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL H.RICHINS; RICHTRON, INC., 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation; and FRONTIER 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corporation, 
Respondents and 
Cross Appellants. 
Supreme Court No. 
890146 
(Priority No. 13) 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
50 West Broadway, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
CRAIG S. COOK 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lke City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
MAY2 19*3 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
MISCONSTRUED THIS COURT'S DECISION OF 
LEIGH FURNITURE AND HAS MISSTATED THE 
ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FIND THE TORT OF 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS , 
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY 
APPLIED APPELLATE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN 
CREATING A FINDING OF FACT FOR SPECIAL 
DAMAGES WHICH WAS NEVER MADE BY THE LOWER 
COURT AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT' S SPECIFIC FINDINGS 5 
CONCLUSION 8 
CASES CITED 
Searle v. Johnson, 
709 P.2d 328 (Utah 1985) 5 
Silliman v. Powell, 
642 P.2d 388 (Utah 1982) 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. SAMPSON, 
Petitioner, Appellant 
and Cross Respondent, 
and 
MILTON R. GOFF, individually 
and as Trustee of MILTON R. 
GOFF TRUST, an unincorporated 
association, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL H. RICHINS; RICHTRON, INC., 
a Utah corporation; RICHTRON 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; RICHTRON GENERAL, 
a Utah corporation; and FRONTIER 
INVESTMENTS, a Utah corporation, 
Respondents and 
Cross Appellants. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS MISCONTRUED 
THIS COURT'S DECISION OF LEIGH 
FURNITURE AND HAS MISSTATED THE 
ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO FIND THE TORT OF 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS. 
Respondents in their Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari have listed a number of acts which they claim 
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constitute the "improper means" of Sampson in this affair. 
(Respondents Brief, pp. 1-14). First, it should be observed that 
many of these purported "improper means" were not specifically 
relied uon by the lower court in making its decision. See, 
Petition, pp. 11-12. Thus, Respondents have again attempted to 
expand the claimed wrongful acts which were not utilized by the 
court in reaching its decision. 
Moreover, even if it is assumed that all of the various 
events listed by Respondents constitute the "improper means" 
relied upon by the court, a finding of predatory conduct still 
cannot be made. It is undisputed that both Sampson and Richins 
were in a hotly contested battle over the control of the limited 
partnerships. As noted in the Petition, the reasons that Sampson 
even came into the picture were simply that Richins' business was 
financially collapsing and Richins voluntarily withdrew from any 
control thereby essentially throwing supervision of the limited 
partners into Sampson's lap. Later, Richins, for whatever reason, 
decided he wanted the control back and battled furiously with 
Sampson and certain limited partners to regain control. 
Admittedly, both parties did everything they could to 
strengthen their own position and weaken that of the other. Both 
made mistakes in judgment and in legal technicalities. However, 
it is submitted that neither party can be said to have used 
"improper means" during this raging battle. Both parties 
attempted to influence the various limited partners by 
communicating with them both directly and indirectly. Both 
parties attempted to gain legal control of the general 
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partnerships in order to receive and distribute the assets of the 
partnerships. Both parties believed that they were in the right 
and that the other party was in the wrong. 
As noted in the Petition, however, none of these actions are 
of the type of conduct specifically prohibited in the Leigh 
Furniture case or in the Oregon decisions upon which Leigh 
Furniture was based. If this type of action is prohibited then 
every attempted take-over of a corporation, every stockholders1 
election for new directors, and hundreds of other examples which 
occur every day in the business environment would give rise to a 
myriad of tortious interference lawsuits. 
There is clearly certain types of conduct which under any 
circumstances would give rise to liability. If Sampson had hired 
thugs to intimidate Richins into withdrawing from the contest, if 
Sampson had bribed government officials or other interested 
parties, if Sampson had committed fraud or attempted to use 
unlawful trade practices to drive Richins out of business, then no 
claim could now be asserted by Sampson in this case. However, 
these types of blatant acts did not occur. Rather, Sampson is 
charged with giving erroneous legal advice, failing to ethically 
protect the interests of Richins even though he believed he never 
represented Richins, assisting the Internal Revenue in collecting 
on delinquent taxes owed by Richins, and a host of other acts 
which in and of themselves cannot be said to be predatory per 
se. 
In Leigh Furniture the defendant filed two lawsuits 
against the plaintiffs. The filing of a lawsuit cannot be said to 
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be an "improper means" in and of itself. Thousands of lawsuits 
are filed each week by parties seeking to assert valid claims. 
Yet, this Court concluded that the filing of the lawsuit was an 
"improper means" because the lawsuits were "groundless". Thus, 
this Court essentially determined as a factual matter that the 
suits were filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff. It was not the filing of a lawsuit but the filing of a 
bad faith lawsuit which created liability in that case. This 
distinction is critical and must be explained in a subsequent 
decision to prevent the present confusion which now exists in the 
lower courts. 
Richins acknowledges that the lower court entered 
inconsistent findings as to the intentions of Sampson. (Richins1 
Brief, pp. 17-18). While finding, on the one hand, that Sampson 
was motivated by a vendetta to oust Richins, the court also found 
that Sampson acted in good faith in trying to represent the 
interests of the limited partners. The court analyzed good faith 
in terms of punitive damages but failed to do so in terms of 
"improper means". 
A review of the cases in which tortious interference claims 
are made reveals that almost all of them will involve instances 
where both compensatory and punitive damages are allowed. In 
Leigh Furniture, for example, the same bad faith which created the 
"groundless lawsuit" also gave rise to the punitive damage award. 
In this case, however, there is an internal inconsistency with 
finding that Sampson acted improperly but did so for a proper 
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motive and with good intentions. 
Finally, Richins' claim that "good faith" is a privilege is 
simply wrong. (Richins1 Brief, p. 18). As noted in the Petition 
a person who asserts a privilege does so regardless of any finding 
of tortious liability. The status of the person rather than his 
good faith belief is what gives the protection to circumvent 
liability from the tort. For example, in Searle v. Johnson, 709 
P.2d 328 (Utah 1985) this Court held that the privilege of 
petitioning the government for grievances overrides any action of 
boycotting which would otherwise be considered tortious 
interference. In effect, therefore, a "privilege" immunizes an 
otherwise culpable defendant. 
For the reasons originally stated in the Petition, therefore, 
the Court of Appeals erred in failing to recognize the various 
distinctions required in analyzing the conduct in a tortious 
interference case and therefore this Court should exercise its 
power to correct the present confusion and injustice. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED 
APPELLATE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN 
CREATING A FINDING OF FACT FOR SPECIAL 
DAMAGES WHICH WAS NEVER MADE BY THE LOWER 
COURT AND WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE LOWER 
COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS. 
Richins contends that the discussion by the court on page 232 
of its Verdict somehow justifies the finding on page 234 of 
$250,000 general damages. This argument is clearly incorrect for 
several reasons. First, the lower court specifically informed 
counsel during the motion for new trial that the $250,000 was 
considered as general damages. It is therefore a complete fiction 
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to try to find a justification for this award in the Court's 
Findings when the Court did not believe that specific itemized 
damages were necessary. 
Second, the amount in the bank account of $288,597 is 
obviously not $250,000. Moreover, the amount discussed on page 
232 of the Court's Verdict which Richins now recites is $274,320. 
Thus, none of the three amounts are the same. 
Finally, the Court never concluded that the money from the 
bank accounts was wrongfully used by Sampson but instead 
essentially concluded that the money had been used on behalf of 
the limited partnerships. Without this finding of wrongful taking 
no award can be justified. 
Richins then cites several cases of this Court which 
supposedly justifies the actions of the Court of Appeals and the 
lower court. (Richins1 Brief, pp. 20-22). The Peterson, Allphin 
and Foss Lewis & Sons Construction Co. cases all involve the 
application of legal theories to affirm a decision of the lower 
court. In each instance, a statute or other legal principle was 
applied by the appellate court even though it had not been applied 
by the district court. This rule, however, is not appropriate in 
the instant case since we are not dealing with legal principles of 
liability but factual findings. 
The Bastian and Winsness cases are also illustrative of 
the errors committed. In Winsness the lower court dismissed a 
lawsuit for failure of the plaintiff to prove lost profits from 
the unlawful closing of a service station. This Court held that 
there were means available by which the plaintiff could produce 
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credible evidence to establish those profits and therefore it was 
improper to dismiss the claim on the basis of speculation. (In 
light of Richins' footnote 8 of his Brief, p. 21, it may be noted 
that Sampsonfs present counsel served as co-counsel in the 
Winsness case for the successful appellant). 
The Bastian case relied upon by Richins strongly supports 
the position of Sampson. In that case the general principles of 
speculative damages was cited and the court noted that a defendant 
may not escape liability because the amount of damage cannot be 
proved with precision. In reversing the decision of the lower 
court, however, this Court stated: 
In this case, however, we have no way of knowing 
from the Findings of Fact on what basis the crop damages 
were computed. The Findings do not indicate either the 
theory on which the damages were computed or the dollar 
values used to reach the figure of $2,966. The Findings 
simply state that the damage to the crop amounted to 
that figure. . . . 
The Findings of Fact must provide a basis for 
determining whether there is a rational basis for the 
award of damages. Proper findings are essential to 
enable this Court to perform its function of assuring 
that the findings support the judgment and that the 
evidence supports the findings. . . . 
Our concern as to the basis for the damage award is 
furthered by a minute entry made by the trial judge 
showing damage of $2,817 to the crops, the cost of 
harvesting to be $1,408.75, the value of stubble and 
court costs to be $1,568 and damage to the pipe of $500. 
We are not able to ascertain from these or any other 
figures how the award of $2,966 was computed. 
Therefore, we have no alternative but to remand the case 
for the entry of findings which supports the damage 
award, or if the award is erroneous for a 
redetermination of damages. See, Silliman v. 
Powell, Utah, 642 P.2d 388 (1982). 661 P.2d 953, 597 
(Utah 1983) . 
Here, there is equally no basis to justify the $250,000 award 
and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of 
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speculative damages to the facts of this case* 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, therefore, Petitioner respectfully 
requests that certiorari be granted and that these manifest errors 
be corrected. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May, 1989. 
Craig S\jCook 
Attorney' for Sampson 
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